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THE LIBERAL NEUTRALITY OF LIVING AND
DYING: BIOETHICS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
AND POLITICAL THEORY IN THE AMERICAN
RIGHT-TO-DIE DEBATE
Bruce Jennings*
Both medical treatment near the end of life and care of the dying
are two important issues confronting medicine as the aging society
moves from dawn to high noon. How insightfully, imaginatively, and
creatively will moral and legal discourse respond to the fundamental
human challenge of accepting our mortality, dependency, and fini-
tude? The answer to this question will determine, in large part, how
well or how badly most of us shall die.
A recently developed reading of philosophical and political liberal-
ism holds the key to how well bioethics will respond to this challenge.
This reading of liberalism is commonly referred to as the theory of
"liberal neutrality." This theory holds that public power should not be
used to favor any particular conception of the human good, but must
remain impartial among competing and conflicting conceptions. Al-
though compelling and attractive in many ways, liberal neutrality does
not meet the needs of the aging society. Instead, liberal neutrality
provides an unduly abstract and individualistic public philosophy of
death and dying, putting too much weight on individual rights to per-
sonal control without refining the concepts of reciprocity, mutuality,
and interdependence. These are precisely the concepts that are essen-
tial to the language, self-consciousness, and agency of a genuinely
multi-generational society of care giving, community, and common re-
spect. Liberal neutrality provides but one way to bring bioethics and
the law together. This essay provides a critical account of liberalism's
public philosophy of death and dying, and reflects on how society
might begin developing a viable alternative to it.
M.A., Princeton University, 1973; B.A., Yale University, 1971.
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I. LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
In recent years, some of the most influential philosophers in the
western world constructed a remarkable normative paradigm by com-
bining elements from liberal political theory, neo-Kantian ethics, and a
constitutional jurisprudence centered on individual rights. These areas
of thought and philosophy form the paradigm of liberal neutrality.
I
Liberal neutrality has three basic tenets, roughly drawn from the
three aforementioned traditions: (1) the doctrine of the moral primacy
of the right over the good; (2) the legal primacy of individual rights
over collective considerations of social utility; and (3) the political
primacy of non-interference, impartiality, and neutrality on the part of
the state in relation to beliefs held by individuals. The first tenet gen-
erally fits with a deontological, rather than consequentialist metaethic,
drawn not only from Kant, but also from the contractarian tradition.
The other two tenets are consistent with the type of constitutional lib-
eralism that has developed in the United States, particularly in the
post-World War II period and throughout the modern civil rights era.
Under this view of liberalism, matters of promoting a measure of
egalitarian social justice and protecting individual rights are properly
the concern of the democratic state acting on behalf of the entire po-
litical community. Conversely, matters of a more positive duty and
moral aspiration concerning human self-realization and the good life
are matters of private belief. When addressing matters of private be-
liefs in which a liberal society as a whole cannot agree, liberal neu-
trality dictates that the state must take the role of a neutral intermedi-
ary, enforcing only meta-norms of tolerance, diversity, and mutual re-
spect.
II. BIOETHICS AND LAW
Liberal neutrality relates directly to bioethics by offering an account
of rights and regulation of medical decision making at the end of life,
and relates indirectly to bioethics by propounding a particular view of
the relationship between ethics and the law. Understanding how liberal
neutrality connects ethics and the law is a prerequisite for under-
standing the substantive stance it takes on end-of-life issues. One can
begin to understand liberal neutrality by considering the basic rela-
1. The literature on liberal neutrality is enormous, with John Rawls as the
principal architect of this version of liberalism.
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tionships between bioethics and the law; two senses in which a rela-
tionship may be identified are through a substantive connection and a
discursive connection.
The substantive relationship between bioethics and the law relates
to the specific way that any particular work in bioethics understands,
either implicitly or explicitly, the proper nature, scope, and legitimacy
of the law. Conversely, this relationship, in any particular work of ju-
risprudence, understands the force and function of moral argument,
both .in court and in relationship to the legitimacy of the court's
authority in the broader political culture. For example, it is possible to
conceive of a kind of bioethics that would countenance only the force
of moral argument within the medical profession and that would reject
any recourse to the courts, or to the state, as proper forums for making
and enforcing normative arguments about the practice of medicine or
conduct of science. However, it is also possible to imagine forms of
jurisprudence or philosophies of law in which there are virtually no
roles for moral argumentation at all. While such bioethical and juris-
prudencial views are imaginable, neither has emerged in the main-
stream of either field in the United States during recent years.
American bioethicists consider the law and courts as the great re-
forming ally in a joint effort to vindicate patients' rights while curbing
excessive professional power. American constitutional law, for its
part, also gives an enormously influential push away from both legal
formalism and legal realism through the work of Ronald Dworkin and
others who regard the Constitution as essentially an embodiment of a
modem liberal moral consensus. With respect to this view, the proper
task of judicial interpretation is to bring out the universal moral con-
tent of the law while considering the light of changing social condi-
tions and circumstances. Thus, substantive connections can be forged
between bioethics and the law in which the thought of each discipline
makes normative room for the other.
A second type of relationship between bioethics and the law is what
might be termed a "discursive connection." This relationship is less a
compatibility of substantive doctrine between the two fields than an
affinity or "mimicry" between the conceptual frameworks and analytic
reasoning styles of each mode of discourse. In American bioethics,
and in at least some parts of American constitutional jurisprudence,
there is a high degree of affinity between the conceptual languages
used. Without knowing the author's primary institutional or discipli-
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nary identity, it is often impossible to tell if one is reading an article
by an academic bioethicist or a professor of constitutional law.
There are two reasons why this discursive mimicry evolved. First,
end-of-life cases have drawn upon areas of constitutional law most
germane to bioethical questions, such as the Fourteenth Amendment,2
or the analogous portions of state constitutions. A second reason for
this discursive connection is that judges and constitutional lawyers
have gravitated, while handling Fourteenth Amendment issues, toward
a set of questions and concepts involving the meaning and limits of
individual rights. This discussion calls for use of the conceptual tools
and reasoning skills highly developed in the school of analytic phi-
losophy, which spread from Oxford and Cambridge in the 1950s to the
major North American universities. Those who study moral philoso-
phy, bioethics, or constitutional law at an advanced university level in
the United States are thoroughly trained in that particular style of
analysis, while both the history of ethics and the continental styles of
philosophical discourse are virtually ignored.
Accordingly, when we speak of the relationship between bioethics
and the law, consideration must be given to both the substantive and
the discursive dimensions of any problem. On both of these levels,
American bioethics and constitutional law are tightly bound together
through the paradigm of liberal neutrality, where its substantive ac-
counts of moral philosophy and constitutional interpretation are tailor-
made to fit the reform agenda of liberal bioethics. Its working lan-
guage is an analytic philosophy proven to be convincing and appealing
both to the courts and to medical elites as an idiom of analytic logic.
If these principles hold true, then it follows that the relationship
between bioethics and the law establishes a relationship that is not a
dyadic structure at all, but in effect, is a three-way relationship be-
tween bioethics, the law, and politics or political theory. For liberal
neutrality is itself a normative ethic, a constitutional vision, and a po-
litical theory, and each of these has been enormously influential on the
development of bioethics.
This paper, however, does not attempt to trace out this suggestion
fully in the intellectual history of American bioethics. Instead, it dis-
cusses how this paradigm works in the so-called right-to-die debate.
This debate originally began as an attempt to empower patients, their
families, or other surrogates, in decision making about the use of life-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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sustaining medical technologies in critical care settings. The debate
has run its course from the New Jersey State Supreme Court in In re
Quinlan,3 to the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health.4 After an evolution of approximately
twenty-five years, this debate culminated in a movement to legalize
physician assisted suicide (PAS), moving from a recognition of the in-
dividual's right to determine the nature and type of medical treatment
received, to a recognition of the right to determine the precise nature,
circumstances, and timing of one's own death.
III. THE DECADE OF DEATH AND DYING
In the early 1990s, bioethics found itself in an interesting lull, a
kind of holiday truce between advocates from both sides of the debate.
While the patient's right to refuse treatment, even life-sustaining
treatment, is legally and morally secured,5 the next battle, covering the
legalization of physician assisted suicide, appears ready to begin.
The 1990s will be remembered as a decade marked by an increasing
social awareness of death and dying.6 The decade began with the
United States Supreme Court's first landmark ruling on end-of-life
care in Cruzan,7 in which the Court recognized that a right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment may exist.8 In Cruzan, the Court found that
under certain circumstances a surrogate may act for the patient in de-
termining end-of-life decisions. 9 Following this decision, a number of
different approaches addressing end-of-life care arose. Congress
3. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
4. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
5. See Alan Meisel, Forgoing Life Sustaining Treatment: The Legal Con-
sensus, KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. (Dec. 1994).
6. See MARILYN WEBB, THE GOOD DEATH: THE NEW AMERICAN SEARCH
TO RESHAPE THE END OF LIFE 28-53 (1997).
7. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
8. "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
prior decisions." Id. at 278; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-
222 (1990) (recognizing that prisoners possess a liberty interest in avoiding un-
wanted anti-psychotic drugs); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30
(1905) (balancing an individual's right to refuse smallpox vaccines against the
state's interest in combating disease).
9. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (recognizing that an incompetent's right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment must be exercised by a surrogate).
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passed the Patient Self-Determination Act, while durable powers of
attorney for health care statutes appeared in many states, including
New York, along with public education efforts to encourage the use of
advance directives. These various approaches all focused on stressing
the importance of considering individual preferences about end-of-life
care.
In the mid 1990s, the SUPPORT study' ° provided rigorous docu-
mentation of the alarming extent to which aggressive life-prolonging
measures were used in situations that were either medically futile,
were unwanted by the patients, or both. Even concerted efforts to im-
prove communication between physicians and dying patients did not
stem the technological momentum of end-of-life care in the country's
major medical centers. Moreover, a large proportion of families re-
ported that the patient spent the last two or three days of life in severe,
unrelieved pain.nI
Public fear of losing control of care at the end of life, becoming de-
pendent on machines, becoming an emotional and financial burden to
one's family, and suffering due to inadequate treatment of pain and
other symptoms, all led to a growing grassroots movement to legalize
PAS. These fears were dramatized by the public defiance of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, the debate over the Oregon referendum that legalized PAS
for the first time in the United States, and by the Federal Appeals
Court rulings in the Second and Ninth Circuits, Quill v. Vacco 2 and
Compassion in Dying v. Washington13 (the PAS cases), that temporar-
ily struck down existing state laws aimed at limiting PAS. The Su-
preme Court also refused to interfere with the Oregon Death with Dig-
nity Act, 14 leaving the constitutional door open for other states to
10. See SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve
Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Progno-
ses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment, 274 JAMA 1591
(1995).
11. See id. at 1598.
12. 97 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) rev'd Washington v. Glucksberg et al., 521
U.S. 702 (1997).
14. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800,
127.805 (1996). Under the Act, a capable adult resident who
has been determined by the attending physician and consulting
physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has
voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written
request for medication for the purpose of ending his life in a hu-
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change their laws on PAS. Since that decision, a referendum to legal-
ize PAS failed in Michigan, while Dr. Kevorkian was convicted of
murder for ending the life of a man with advanced amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis.1 5
Over the past decade, several groups mounted a less contentious
educational and institutional effort to change and improve end-of-life
care. No doubt, the prospect of a movement towards legalized PAS
throughout the country quickened these less radical reform efforts.
Within the health care professions, attention is being directed towards
improving the standard of practice in pain management and palliative
care. Specialists in this area have long argued that medical education
and the knowledge level within medicine are not sufficient to meet
patient needs, and that there is a systematic and persistent under-
treatment of pain in the mainstream American health care system. As a
result, interest in hospice and utilization of hospice services acceler-
ated in the 1990s, nearly doubling from roughly ten percent of those
dying of chronic and terminal disease each year (principally, but not
exclusively from various forms of cancer) to about seventeen percent
by the end of the decade. Efforts by hospitals and community groups
to educate consumers concerning the use of advance directives also
increased during this period. In addition, new curricula for medical
and nursing education were developed and implemented, and a recent
Institute of Medicine study, Approaching Death,16 contains what may
now be regarded as a general consensus among experts in the, area
concerning what needs to be done for future care towards the ch'roni-
cally ill. 7
When the first hospice program in the United States began in Con-
necticut in 1973, end-of-life care was an orphan field - one of little
interest to mainstream medicine which was too busy fighting President
Nixon's war on cancer. At that time, end-of-life care was such a so-
cially and culturally taboo subject. Even clergy were uncomfortable
discussing it and seminaries offered virtually no training in pastoral
mane and dignified manner in accordance with [the provisions of
the Act]
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805.
15. Kervorkian's conviction was based upon a videotape of the assisted
suicide broadcast on the television program 60 Minutes in November 1998.
16. MARILYN J. FIELD & CHRISTINE K. CASSEL, APPROACHING DEATH:
IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE (1997).
17. See id. at 259-271.
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counseling for terminally ill persons or bereavement counseling for
families. As late as the mid-1980s, magazines such as Modern Matur-
ity, read by millions of American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP) members, did not carry articles on death and dying, advance
directives, or palliative care, because these subjects ran counter to the
image of the healthy and active seniors that such publications were
trying to project.
These attitudes still exist, but society shows signs that it can no
longer afford the luxury of ignoring end-of-life issues and that there
must be a wide-spread civic conversation about the values that ought
to guide end-of-life care options and choices in America. Presently,
approximately two million foreseeable deaths occur each year in the
United States, more than half of which take place in a hospital or other
health care facility.' 8 In those institutions, as many as seventy percent
of the deaths come after some deliberate non-treatment decision, in-
cluding a "do-not-resuscitate order," has been made.1
9
The question of what ccnstitutes a "good death" or "good care" near
the end of life must not be suppressed. Despite the remarkable atten-
tion and energy devoted to this notion in the 1990s, a firm grasp on the
issue continues to elude bioethicists, perhaps in part because end-of-
life care has been seen as "a personal trouble," rather than a "civic
problem., 20 A personal trouble resides within the individual's own
heart and mind, or at most within the ambit of the individual's own
immediate family.2' In contrast, a civic problem reveals the connection
between what individuals experience in their personal and family lives
and the larger structures of social custom, cultural belief, combined
with political and economic powers that surround them. 22 Dying, one
of the most intimate and private of personal experiences, is not only a
personal experience; dying is socially and culturally shaped. To ad-
dress the question of "good dying" as a civic question, for example,
one that engages the shared values of our community of diverse faiths,
backgrounds, and needs, it is necessary to challenge prevailing argu-
ments that render such questions suspect or illegitimate. That is pre-
cisely what the paradigm of liberal neutrality does and is precisely
18. See id. at 34-39.
19. See id.
20. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 8-9 (1959).
21. See id.
22. See id.
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why the prevailing arguments must be challenged.
IV. APPLYING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY TO ETHICS AND LAW AT
THE END OF LIFE
A paradigm's function is to structure our moral perspective and
imagination in particular ways so that certain questions come to the
foreground, allowing various components of human experience to be
seen in one way rather than another. Liberal neutrality does this in
subtle and telling ways. The use of liberal neutralism, a lens through
which to understand the ethical, political, and the legal issues at stake
in the American right-to-die debate, is widespread in bioethics and
thus could be explicated by reference to any number of writings in the
field. Liberal neutrality finds its most intelligent and uncompromising
formulation in the work of Ronald Dworkin, who is generally not con-
sidered a bioethicist, but whose work has been highly influential in the
field.
In LIFE'S DOMINION, 23 Dworkin attempts to show that the culture
wars over both abortion and euthanasia can be resolved, and an ethi-
cal-legal modus vivendi achieved, by recourse to the tenets of liberal
neutrality theory.24 He believes that the sanctity of life and the value
one places on prolonged life are fundamental components of a con-
ception of the human good.25 Dworkin explains that reasonable per-
sons will disagree about the sanctity of life and the role of law.26 He
proffers that the function of public morality is to preserve the space of
that disagreement and to remain comfortable living in accordance with
one's beliefs.2 He believes that the role of law is not to settle such
disagreements nor to bring the coercive power of the state down on
one side or another in this dispute.
28
Dworkin's argument reiterates that if individuals cannot reasonably
agree on when life begins, or on the relative value of fetal life, and if
we cannot reasonably agree on when dying begins, or on the relative
value of living while dying, then in both cases the law should not be
used to interfere with and override the individual's liberty to act. This
23. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 3-29 (1993).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 181-182.
27. See id. at 28-29.
28. See Dworkin, supra note 23, at 157-159.
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is best described as "liberty of conscience," which makes policy ques-
tions concerning abortion and euthanasia analogous to constitutional
questions over religious freedom. 29 Included under this liberty of con-
science are the interests that a person has in controlling the circum-
stances surrounding his or her own body and fundamental life activi-
ties, which Dworkin dubs "critical interests," akin to constitutional is-
sues of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.30
Such reasoning leads Dworkin to the conclusion that the Supreme
Court was correct, although not always for the right reasons, in abor-
tion cases. He believes the state should not interfere with a woman's
freedom to continue or to discontinue her pregnancy; to do so coer-
cively imposes a conception of religious beliefs onto non-consenting
individuals who do not share those private beliefs.3 '
The same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to laws pertaining to
the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment, PAS, or active eutha-
nasia. Dworkin argues that the case law from Quinlan to Cruzan cor-
rectly affirmed the right of the individual to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, because he believes that use of the law and the
power of the state to force unwanted treatment onto a patient would
give official sanction to private perceptions of the sanctity of life. 2
Finally, Dworkin asserts that since there is no principled difference
between the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and assistance with
dying via lethal prescription (PAS) or lethal injection (active euthana-
sia), statutes making it a crime for physicians to aid in dying should be
overturned as unconstitutional. Doing so would affirm, he believes,
that the substantive political morality enshrined in the constitution is
essentially that of liberal neutrality.
The Philosophers' Brief 33 is essentially an extension of the theory
of liberal neutrality applied to the specific public policy question of
legalizing PAS. Indeed, the Brief follows closely the version of that
theory put forward in LIFE'S DOMINION. If affirmed and embraced by
the Supreme Court the PAS cases would have replayed a scenario like
29. See generally id. at 30-101.
30. See id. at 201-208.
31. See id. at 165-166.
32. See DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 196-217.
33. Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 96-110).
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that created by Roe v. Wade.34 Few issues have been better positioned
to illustrate the principles of liberal neutrality. With the finding of a
constitutionally protected right for individuals, 35 the court could have
swept aside existing statutes in nearly every state, overriding prevail-
ing legislative majorities. If this occurred, the result would create the
need for a long series of other rulings to clarify and fine tune what
statutory approaches were permissible. This is precisely what liberally
neutral courts are supposed to do in a democracy. On the other hand,
such an exercise of judicial power would have triggered a bitter social
and cultural conflict, akin to that, which has persisted around abortion
for nearly thirty years.
36
Dworkin left no doubt about the continuity between the Brief and
the theory of liberal neutrality. In the Brief, he writes, "defines a very
general moral and constitutional principle that every competent person
has the right to make momentous personal decisions that invoke fun-
damental religious or philosophical convictions about life's value for
himself. 37 The Brief asserts that denying competent, terminally ill pa-
tients, who find their continued life intolerable, the freedom to hasten
their own death is something improper for the state to do." The Brief
bases this assertion on the fact that "individuals have a constitutionally
protected interest in making those grave judgments for themselves,
free from the imposition of any religious or philosophical orthodoxy
by court or legislature." 39 For the state to deny such persons the "op-
portunity" to hasten their death, with or without assistance, "could
only be justified on the basis of a religious or ethical conviction about
the value or meaning of life itself. Our Constitution forbids govern-
ment to impose such convictions on its citizens." 40
The body of theBrief considers other potential justifications for de-
nying this liberty interest and finds them all lacking. It argues that
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied 410 U.S. 959 (1973). In Roe, the
Court recognized that a woman's right to choose to have an abortion was part
of the fundamental constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 153.
35. See id.
36. See JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS 20-42
(1994).
37. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at *6-7.
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prior Court rulings in other areas of medical care decision making,
41
reproductive decisions, 42 and right to privacy 43 protect an individual's
right to make momentous life choices free from the imposition of any
religious, ethical, or philosophical orthodoxy." Finally, it contends
that to decide to hasten one's death, for any personal reason, and with
or without assistance, is one of those constitutionally protected areas
of our liberty.45
Dworkin's premise, in both The Philosopher's Brief and LIFE'S
DOMINION, rests on the notion that state prohibition on ending the life
of one's fetus with medical assistance or ending one's own life with
medical assistance is properly understood as an improper imposition
of a religious or philosophical orthodoxy on citizens. 46 Another view
is that a valid purpose of the state is to prevent one person from di-
rectly and intentionally killing another and that is what laws against
abortion and PAS are all about.
One may argue that this legitimate state purpose 47 is misdirected or
misapplied in the case of particular laws against abortion or PAS, or
that other rights or social interests outweigh this state interest in dis-
couraging intentional killing. Yet, these are not the arguments that
41. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
42. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992) (examining
state regulations aimed to limit abortions); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (examining whether a state's refusal to subsi-
dize abortions limited a woman's right to privacy).
43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a
Connecticut law that barred the use of contraceptives by married persons); see
also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a statute that
prohibited distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons as a violation of
the equal protection clause).
44. See JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§
14.28, 14.29 (1995); "Matters involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to a person's dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
45. See DWORKIN, supra note 33, at *9. The purpose of this essay is not to
engage in a thorough critical analysis of these arguments, instead, the focus is
on the general language and conceptual framework they offer for our under-
standing of the moral situation in end-of-life care.
46. See id.
47. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-156 (holding that the Court will only strike
down abortion laws that are not supported by a compelling state interest).
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Dworkin or the theory of liberal neutrality generally intend to pursue.
Nor do these arguments constitute the radical and compelling para-
digm shift in our moral understanding of individual rights that
Dworkin hopes to accomplish. While one may follow and accept this
approach, Dworkin fails to supply independent reasons or arguments
about why one should do so.
Another aspect of Dworkin's argument is he tends to transform
ideas that many people regard as reasonable and objective moral truth
into matters of quasi-rational or irrational belief.48 This argument
transforms a good deal of the content of what is regarded as public
morality into the realm of private religion, and he seems to do this
sorting in an arbitrary or ideologically motivated way.49 Drawing the
line between public morals and private religion is crucial in a liberal
society, but Dworkin again does not provide much in the way of theo-
retical or procedural justification for doing so. This is all the more
troubling because Dworkin focuses so much of his work on the policy
making role of judges and the courts, and seems to give little place for
democratic politics or politically accountable legislators in the realm
of social policy that touches on fundamental individual rights. This is
a shortcoming of the theory of liberal neutrality generally: it relies far
too heavily on affecting progressive social change through judicial
authority and betrays an orientation toward politics that generally is
elitist and anti-democratic. 0
Given this view of liberal neutrality, some of the following concerns
emerge from the Brief's argument. First, do past court decisions actu-
ally require finding a constitutionally protected right to assistance in
controlling the timing of one's death? Second, even though the cases
under review focused on provisions in state law that penalized physi-
cians for assisting in suicide, the Brief argues grounds for establishing
that an individual has a right to obtain the assistance of anyone he
chooses (and who agrees), not only a physician. It is actually an argu-
ment for assisted suicide, not PAS.
Moreover, liberal neutrality is not merely an argument for assisted.
suicide but also one for direct euthanasia. The Brief supplies no reason
why the dying patient must take her life with her own hand. Emotional
or aesthetic responses to scenarios where the doctor may prescribe the
48. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORTAL 190 (1993).
49. See id. at 190-191.
50. See CASS SUNSTEIN, BEYOND NEUTRALITY 1123-1163 (1997).
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pills a patient takes, or the situation where a family member pulls the
trigger do not factor into the analysis at all. Interestingly enough,
sympathy for the plight of the dying, especially the moving cases rep-
resented by the plaintiffs in the cases, does figure in the Brief, but not
directly in its conceptual or argumentative structure. What the major-
ity opinion by Justice Rehnquist ultimately relied on and embraced in
Glucksberg was the distinction between the right to be free from un-
wanted bodily invasion versus the right to obtain assistance in directly
and deliberately ending one's life.5' Using rhetoric and phraseology
that erases that distinction, The Philosophers' Brief does not address
this distinction adequately.
V. THE FRAMEWORK OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
Viewing the right-to-die and abortion issues through the lens of lib-
eral neutrality affects our understanding in several important respects.
First, it links a seemingly localized question "how should we regulate
medical practice and the use of medical technology in given areas of
practice?" with a societal issue questioning the very nature of our con-
stitutional regime. Whether morally right or wrong, restriction 'of
abortion would not simply restrict the freedom of women, it would
threaten civil and religious liberties across the board. Liberal neutral-
ity would have us believe the same thing about laws governing both
the termination of life-sustaining treatment, PAS, and active euthana-
sia.
Second, in a related gesture, this perspective sets up a linear narra-
tive for the development of the right-to-die debate. According to this
narrative, individual autonomy at the end of life is a logical extension
of the entire civil rights movement of the post-war years. These ques-
tions do not arise primarily because people are living longer or be-
cause advances of medical technology are permitting physicians to
prolong biological life beyond the capacity to restore function or cog-
nitive capacity. In many patients, the use of improved medical tech-
nology may prolong their dying in a burdensome way. However, on
the liberal neutrality account, these questions arise for an altogether
different reason: they represent the next frontier in sweeping away the
51. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-711. "The States' assisted-suicide
bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the
States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life." Id.
(citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280).
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legal residue of a past era when individuals were subject to concep-
tions of how they should live their lives without any sufficient public
protection.
Another significant aspect of the liberal neutrality perspective is
that it erases the distinction between the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment and the right to obtain medical assistance with one's death.
Yet, this precise distinction has emerged over the past twenty-five
years as a linchpin of bioethics and the law at the end of life when
only foregoing life-supports, and not PAS, was the center of attention.
This is important for the sake of ethical and jurisprudential consis-
tency. If there is no principled distinction made between foregoing
treatment and PAS, and if the courts have decided against a prohibi-
tion on the practice of foregoing treatment, then the courts cannot con-
sistently allow a prohibition on the practice of PAS. If there is a com-
mon law right or liberty interest at work, it is the person's right to
choose death, or the autonomy to control the timing and circumstances
of one's own death. In both foregoing treatment and PAS, the patient
exercises the same right, not two different rights, and the patient and
the physician have the same intention or goal, namely, the early death
of the patient to relieve the burden or suffering caused by prolonged
living.
The question is also important from a substantive constitutional
analysis. If there is no principled distinction to be made between the
two approaches, and the courts permit decisions to forgo life-
sustaining treatment but prohibit PAS, a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may arise. The law may ban
or permit both, but it cannot split the difference. This, in essence, is
what the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Quill
v. Vacco.
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Finally, this approach is important both within the Supreme Court
and in the broader political arena. Within the framework of the Su-
preme Court, it is important for the sake of the rule of stare decisis.
Many of those arguing in favor of PAS in the Supreme Court cases of
1997, Glucksberg and Vacco, warned the Court that upholding the ex-
isting prohibition against PAS in state laws would undermine impor-
tant earlier precedents in both the abortion and the right-to-refuse
52. 80 F.3d 716 (2d. Cir. 1996). "The right to suicide finds no cognizable
basis in the Constitution." Id. at 724-25.
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treatment areas. 3 In particular, a ruling against PAS could not be rec-
onciled with either Casey or Cruzan.5 4 Naturally, those favoring the
legal status quo were at pains to deny this, including an additional
amicus brief on behalf of a group of bioethics professors.
For the liberal neutrality perspective to deny the moral force of the
distinction between foregoing treatment and PAS or active euthanasia
is also ironic. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, vitalists and others as-
sociated with the right-to-life movement opposed decisions to forgo
life-sustaining treatment on two grounds. One reason was that this was
no different from murder, or at least mercy killing. 5" The second was a
slippery slope argument that there would be no way to stem the
movement toward; (1) foregoing medically provided nutrition and hy-
dration, (2) giving high doses of narcotics, and (3) allowing active,
intentional killing of the patient.
5 6
In the American right-to-die debate we have come full circle. After
two decades, foregoing treatment has gained legal, ethical, and medi-
cal legitimacy. The right-to-die movement has now turned its attention
to active, intentional, medically assisted dying. Both PAS advocates
and vitalistic right-to-lifers share a linear historical narrative; for the
latter it is a downward spiral and for the former, an ascent toward
moral progress and liberation. Now, as in the past, erasing the moral
distinction between foregoing treatment and aid in dying is a mistake,
with the linear view of history more problematic than it would first
appear.
VI. IN SEARCH OF A LANGUAGE OF MORAL UNDERSTANDING
As an ethical and legal consensus emerged from Quinlan to Cruzan,
with over 100 appellate level cases covering virtually every state in
between, the distinction between foregoing treatment 7 and suicide or
53. See DWORKIN, supra note 33, at *3-5.
54. See id.
55. See Brief for the United States Catholic Conference et al. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *7, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) (No. 96-110).
56. See id. at *23-24.
57. See DWORKIN, supra note 33, at * 11. For example, although Cruzan is
often described as a "right to die" case, see Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d. at
799; Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Cruzan recognized
"the more specific interest in making decisions about how to confront an im-
minent death"), in fact, the more precise conclusion is that: "we assumed that
Liberal Neutrality ofLiving and Dying
assisting suicide 58 was fundamental. 59 In the right-to-die cases, as in
all civil rights cases that involve a state restriction on individual
rights, the burden of proof lies with the state to show a compelling
state or societal interest that justifies the restriction of liberty.
In analyzing cases involving patient or family requests to terminate
life-sustaining treatment, various courts have asked if allowing treat-
ment to be discontinued would violate any important state interests,
including the state's interest in preventing suicide. The courts consis-
tently held that suicide was not implicated in these cases and that this
prevented no obstacle to the right to refuse treatment. This is a prime
example earlier referred to as the discursive mimicry that relates ethics
and the law.
This is a familiar pattern in bioethics: medical technologies create
new possibilities for human choice and action, new kinds of decisions
have to be made, and a new vocabulary must be devised with which to
articulate what these actions are and what intentions and consequences
they involve. Ordinary dictionary definitions are not helpful, and
loose-limbed, casual talk about "wanting to die," the "right-to-die,"
and "passive and active euthanasia" must give way to more precise, if
sometimes stilted and pedantic formulations.
Over time, those who were deliberate and careful in talking about
foregoing treatment abandoned all language of suicide, choosing
death, or intending that the patient die. They began to talk instead
about the patient's right to be free of unduly burdensome and invasive
the Constitution granted competent persons a 'constitutionally protected right'
to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 723; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
279 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
58. "That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the as-
serted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
59. "We assume that the United States Constitution would grant a compe-
tent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. The American Medical Association em-
phasizes the "fundamental difference between refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment and demanding a life-ending treatment." American Medical Association,
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES
IN LAW & MEDICINE 91, 93 (1994); see also Meisel, supra note 5, at 326-328;
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT
DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 54-71
(2d ed. 1992).
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medical interventions, or the right not to have one's life prolonged by
unwanted medical treatment. However, the proper focus is not on
death, but on how one lives during the course of dying. It is not death
that is being chosen, but a certain form of living. Therefore, the term
"right-to-die" is a grave misnomer. In the foregoing treatment cases,
the focus should not be about the right-to-die at all, but about the right
to live in a certain way while dying. The PAS and active euthanasia
arguments, on the other hand, are indeed about the right-to-die.
These distinctions mark something real in the experience of dying
patients, their families, and in the reality of clinical care. Great caution
must be exercised in order to give due recognition to the various ex-
pressions used for PAS. Thus, it seems both cavalier and uncharacter-
istically unsophisticated for Dworkin to assert that the relevant issue is
to distinguish "acts and omissions that are designed to cause death and
those that are not, '60 and then to combine foregoing life-sustaining
treatment and PAS under the heading of acts clearly designed to cause
death.
In a similar vein, The Philosophers' Brief states that
if and when it is permissible for [a doctor] to act with
death in view, it does not matter which of . . .two
means he and his patient choose. If it is permissible for
a doctor deliberately to withdraw medical treatment in
order to allow death to result from a natural process,
then it is equally permissible for him to help his patient
hasten his own death more actively, if that is the pa-
tient's express wish.6'
We should be wary of assimilating the moral significance of fore-
going treatment and PAS under headings "designed to cause death," or
"with death in view," and then using that re-description of the acts to
conclude that they are morally equivalent and that the law should treat
them as being so.
This search for an appropriate ethical and legal idiom to use in
talking about medical decision making near the end of life was not
completed overnight, of course, and it has had its share of missteps
and false starts. The campaign to legalize PAS continues at the level
of state politics with the encouragement of the Supreme Court, which
found no constitutional basis for a right to PAS, but also found no
constitutional bar for creating a statutory right via a democratic legis-
60. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 42.
61. Id. at 45.
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lative process. In that campaign and in the forthcoming politics of
PAS, we will see a concerted attempt to rewrite the lexicon of end-of-
life bioethics. Advocates on both sides understand that what practices
society eventually embraces will depend on how we describe what it is
we seek to justify.
Among the dead ends that have come up during the search for the
right vocabulary have been distinctions such as killing versus letting
die, acts versus omissions, and active euthanasia versus passive eutha-
nasia. There has also been a voluminous discussion about what causes
the patient's death and about various kinds of intentions that patients
and physicians might have, such as intending the patient's death ver-
sus merely foreseeing it.
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Most of these discussions boil down to questions of causation. The
act versus omission distinction, preposterous on its face when applied
to something like terminal and intensive medical care, seems promis-
ing because common sense suggests that one cannot really cause
something to happen by omitting to act. Therefore, one cannot be di-
rectly responsible for an outcome based on omission. The justification
is doctors do not kill when they only stand aside and watch. Similarly,
the killing versus letting die slogan seems attractive because the un-
derlying disease process, not the act of foregoing life-sustaining
treatment, is what really causes the patient's death.63
The trouble with much of these arguments is that there are no such
things as "omissions" in the care of the dying, and if there are, they
fall under the heading of abuse and neglect, not foregoing treatment.
Something, whether aggressive or palliative care, is always being done
to, and for, a dying patient. So there are only actions here, actions of
intervention and actions of non-intervention, but actions nonetheless.
Any of these actions potentially bear moral and legal responsibility.
No one human action is the cause of death. Human actions and bio-
logical processes are both involved in a person's dying and death, and
thus, rather than discovering a single cause we find multiple causal
62. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 76-82 (1993);
F.M. Kamm, Physician Assisted Suicide, The Doctrine of Double Effect, and
the Ground of Value, ETHICs 586, 586-591 (April 1999).
63. "[W]hen a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies
from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal
medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication." Vacco,
521 U.S. at 801; see also People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
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chains.
Some still cling to the hope that these causes can be fit into a pattern
like deductive explanations in the natural sciences, and that an as-
signment of moral and legal responsibility can be inferred from that
pattern of causal antecedence. On the contrary, these multiple causal
chains should be fit together in a pattern that has the properties of a
narrative rather than a scientific explanation. A narrative is an expla-
nation or interpretation of meaning that assigns moral responsibility to
human agents in varying degrees. In other words, we do not logically
infer moral responsibility from causal explanations; instead, we con-
struct causal accounts at least partly on the basis of pre-established
moral sensibilities and interpretations. 64 Moral interpretation and as-
signment of responsibility precedes causal knowledge, not the other
way around.
VII. THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON AND MORAL TRESPASS
Liberal neutrality offers one way in which to transform medical re-
sponses to dying and to the deliberate ending of a human life from a
personal trouble into a civic problem. Yet, liberal neutrality may not
offer the best way to frame end-of-life decisions as a civic problem.
The blind spots in its perspective are too large, and the way it leaves
us to articulate the life world and care of the dying is finally inade-
quate.
Like all work in ethics and the law, the frame of liberal neutrality is
an abstraction, a figurative construction of moral reality that shapes
the experience, and hence the nature, of that reality in particular ways.
This is not a fault of liberal neutrality, because all theoretical frame-
works (even realist, positivist, or naturalistic ones that purport not to
be) are figurative constructions of reality. The problem with any the-
ory lies with what it leaves out, erases, or obscures.
In the case of liberal neutrality, its conceptual framework obscures
or erases the surrounding interpersonal context of the dying process. It
flattens an otherwise multidimensional reality, substitutes abstractions
like "power," "control," and "interests," for entangled relationships
and intertwined feelings, memories, fears, hopes, regrets, and recon-
ciliations that admit of no such tidy characterizations.
While this realm of thought resists capture in the individualistic
language of liberalism, the experiences are neither incorrigibly idio-
64. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 84 (1990).
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syncratic nor wholly subjective. Without a shared culture and sustain-
ing relationships, we could not feel at all. Yet, liberal neutrality inter-
nalizes everything that is most social, cultural, and inter-subjective
about the experience of life; it treats all of this as cognitive "beliefs. 65
This type of psychology is particularly debilitating when talking about
life at the end of life. One wonders whether this account really sus-
tains the notion of what it is to have a belief at all, or how a dying per-
son could tell the difference between a momentous decision and a
trivial one. Respecting autonomy gives private choice value only be-
cause beyond autonomy there is a public, subjective realm of shared
meaning and mutual activity that gives each of us things of value to
choose.
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In short, liberal neutrality obscures crucial aspects of the human
experience of dying and care-giving that other theoretical frameworks
can better accommodate and articulate. Two new concepts are intro-
duced in this section which illustrate how we can go beyond the lan-
guage of liberal neutrality, "relational integrity of the person" and the
need to protect dying persons from "moral trespass."
Returning to the line of cases concerning the right to forgo life-
sustaining treatment, over time two basic grounds for recognizing this
right emerged. One approach is recognition of a constitutional right of
the individual to control the most important aspects of her life and
conduct.67 In the aftermath of the Supreme Court rulings on contra-
ception and abortion, initially this right was associated with the con-
cept of privacy. 68 Later, especially in Cruzan, the Court referred to this
right as a "liberty interest" located within the Fourteenth
Amendment. 69 Bioethics emphasizes this same notion, calling it indi-
vidual autonomy or the right to self-determination.
The second ground for the right to refuse treatment is a right that re-
sides in the tradition of the common law as the right to be protected
from non-consensual touching (battery) or unwanted bodily invasion.
65. IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 17 (1959).
66. See WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF
AUTONOMY 228-246 (1996).
67. See DWORKIN, supra note 33, at *3-4.
68. See id.
69. See id. at *10-11, but cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(holding that extraction of blood from an individual suspected of driving while
intoxicated does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination or other
constitutional rights).
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The development of the law of informed consent extends this common
law protection to physicians and medical care settings. Throughout the
period culminating in the Cruzan ruling, these two grounds were con-
nected together in arguments favoring policies and practices, such as
advance directives, to facilitate the patient's right to refuse treatment.
The movement and arguments to legalize PAS, however, drove a
wedge between the autonomy and the bodily integrity notions. This
occurred because the autonomy notion seems to support the contention
that there is no principled distinction drawn between foregoing treat-
ment and PAS, while the bodily integrity notion clearly applies to
foregoing treatment but not to PAS. For in the latter case, it is not
medical treatment or technology that is violating bodily integrity, but
the disease process itself.
In the many amici briefs filed in support of the respondents in the
PAS cases, groups that for many years defended patient autonomy
suddenly back-paddled with some vigor. Although he does not often
use the term explicitly in this connection, Dworkin clearly allies him-
self with those in bioethics who ground the right to refuse treatment
on autonomy. However, this issue must be handled with care by pro-
ponents of liberal neutrality because protecting and promoting indi-
vidual autonomy is itself a substantive conception of the human good,
or a philosophy of life."0 If this is the case, liberal neutrality would
have to exclude it from public morality and make it a matter of private
belief. Then, it could hardly be said to be a constitutional principle or
protected right governing state action at the end of life. Despite this
potential complication, autonomy-based bioethics and the theory of
liberal neutrality have joined forces in the PAS debate, at least in the
philosophical wing of the field.
'Why not ground the right to refuse treatment on the right to bodily
integrity and leave it at that? Because, if autonomy tends to justify too
much, bodily integrity justifies too little. For one thing, common law
traditions can be superseded by democratic statutes and do not have
the same significance as constitutional rights. In an aging society, it
will probably be necessary to have closure on these rights at the con-
stitutional level. This presents an interesting dilemma, however, where
important questions of morality always develop into constitutional
ones. Utilization of this approach gives undue power to the courts and
70. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-79 (1986).
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bespeaks a lack of faith in democracy.7'
Moreover, the concept of bodily integrity is too narrow and physi-
cally defined to capture all that we want to protect and preserve for the
dying person.72 It invites distracting questions covering what medical
procedures are really "invasive" and which are not, as seen in the case
of artificial feeding tubes."
The proper approach should incorporate a metaphorical extension of
the notion of bodily integrity, one that is more focused on the sur-
rounding relationships, the ecology of dying, and not just with the
boundary of the skin. Thus, it is not simply the physical integrity of
the body that we should care about, but the integrity of the person as
well. This approach recognizes both the physical confines of one's
own body and the extended social space making up most of one's per-
sonhood and moral identity. This is always important, but never more
so than near the end of life, when the scope of one's activities and ac-
tive relationships focuses on family, intimate friends, and professional
caregivers. For each person, the exact diameter of this social space
will differ, however, it is this extended skin that exhibits certain
qualities and characteristics.
A dying person has a right to a certain quality of living while dying:
a right to a decent, competent, respectful, and nurturing social ecol-
ogy. Among those things that undermine a good social ecology near
the end of life are uncontrolled pain, incompetent caregivers, isolation
or abandonment, intrusive medical technology, unwanted institutional
settings, and physical invasion of the body. Anything that violates and
undermines the social ecology of personhood and caring constitutes a
moral trespass, and it is an appropriate task of bioethics, the law, and
public policy to protect the individual. While not yet explored, this
next section suggests that answers to these notions can be found in an
undeveloped and unexplored thread of the Quinlan case.
VIII. QUINLAN: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
When one goes back and rereads the text of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court decision in Quinlan utilizing the linear narrative ap-
proach, the textual argument becomes virtually incomprehensible.
71. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 1123.
72. See Dan Brock, A Critique of Three Objections to Physician Assisted
Suicide, ETHICS 519, 526-31 (1999).
73. See id.
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From the perspective of liberal neutrality, the opinion spends an inor-
dinate amount of time on seemingly irrelevant issues; for example, the
lengthy discussion on "a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their
healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or self-
protection concerns. 74 Furthermore, when the opinion mentions an
"ethics committee,"05 the panel appears to accept the belief that a
medical prognosis committee could override the patient's autonomous
choice to forgo life-sustaining treatment.76 The opinion appears hope-
lessly inconsistent as it moves back and forth between what we would
now call the principle of respect for persons and the principle of be-
neficence or best interests." It does not have a notion of substituted
judgment such that it is really Karen, the patient, who will make the
decision through Mr. Quinlan; the court appears to think that the fam-
ily must be trusted and Mr. Quinlan will make the ultimate decision.
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Also implicit in Quinlan is a very different way of looking at the
moral reality, the moral life world of the dying and care giving proc-
esses. Given this view, the lessons of Quinlan remain evolving and
unsettled in law and bioethics. Quinlan supplied the line of reasoning
about decisions near the end of life by supplying both respect for
autonomy and respect for relational integrity in the terminology used
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, namely the notion of "privacy."
79
Of these two views, only the autonomy side of privacy has been rec-
ognized and built upon in any systematic way by bioethics subsequent
to Quinlan.
The other idea of privacy in Quinlan is the idea that the rights and
fundamental interests of the dying are compromised when the moral
space of the person and the physical space of the body is trespassed
upon.8° This idea is the road not yet taken.
74. 355 A.2d at 668.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 668-69. The court observed the statements of Dr. Karen
Teel, who wrote that "[p]hysicians, by virtue of their responsibility for medical
judgments are, partly by choice and partly by default, charged with the respon-
sibility of making ethical judgments which we are sometimes ill-equipped to
make. We are not always morally and legally authorized to make them." Id.
at 668.
77. See id. at 663-664.
78. See id. at 653.
79. See Quinlan, 335 A.2d at 662-663.
80. See id. at 664.
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The idea of privacy as personal integrity involves the notion that the
human good requires a defense against moral trespass and protection
of the security and integrity of one's person. Privacy as moral security
is an ecological or relational notion, not a notion of independence of
solitude often conveyed by the notions of privacy or property in other
contexts, which involve cutting the self off from others behind protec-
tive fences. One reason why the idea of relational integrity did not
emerge from the language of Quinlan is that the semantic register of
the notion of the right to privacy was simply too powerfully individu-
alistic.8'
One of the motifs of Quinlan is the intrusive presence of machines
at or near the bedside of the patient. Not only were these machines
prolonging Karen's dying process, they interfered with the kind of
caring, vigilant relationship that the family wished to have with her.
This intrusive presence forms the fatal flaw in end-of-life care. The
nursing routine and the functions of the intensive care unit were in
service to the machine, not Karen, and they took precedence over the
needs and proper performance of the family.8 2 While the staff ex-
pressed no ill will or malice towards Karen's condition,8 3 the result
was an ecological reality in the situation, a fact of the care giving and
grieving experience. The court had no real way to express this para-
digm, but recognized its existence and expressed a desire to acknowl-
edge and ameliorate it.
The decision is also interesting for the absence of rhetoric of suspi-
cion or questions of conflict of interest. The court's focus is almost
personal and friendly toward the Quinlan family.T The court quickly
dispatched such notions by establishing the character of both the
guardian and the family. That seems odd in light of the main issues in
later cases, but understandable as a means of grounding the decision in
the quality of the relationships that might surround the patient if the
medical interventions did not prevent those relationships. This made
81. Compare the continuing argument about abortion rights in which any
entangling or encumbering relationships, to use Michael Sandel's apt phrase,
such as parental notification, notification of the biological father, waiting peri-
ods for counseling, and the like, are strenuously opposed as violations of the
woman's rights or autonomy, because it is said, there is no way from keeping
these relationships from becoming coercive.
82. See Interview with Mrs. Joseph Quinlan (1995).
83. See id.
84. See Quinlan, 335 A.2d at 671.
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the central issue not whether "Do I want to die?" nor even, "Do I want
these machines?" but rather, "How do I want to be cared for?,
8 5
Another interesting aspect of the Quinlan decision is the serious at-
tention the court pays to the teachings of the Quinlan family's relig-
ion, Roman Catholicism. 6 Karen's family relied heavily, and quoted
extensively an amicus brief submitted by the New Jersey Catholic
Conference.87 After closely considering the implications of the Quin-
lans' religion, the court failed to establish that allowing the ventilator
to be removed would not violate those religious beliefs.88
A later attitude, and certainly the one offered by liberal neutrality,
would be that the entire subject of religion is irrelevant to the court's
business. The Quinlan court did not interpret this as a violation of the
separation of church and state, nor did it focus on the danger of im-
posing some orthodox beliefs on Karen. In an uncanny configuration
of liberal neutrality, Mr. Quinlan asserted his right to decide his
daughter's medical treatment based on his right to exercise his relig-
ion, among other grounds.8 9 The court rejected that argument, but
channeled the religious question into his fitness as the guardian and
how his faith would affect his relation to his daughter. Hence, the
court took this question to be a vital factor in understanding the social
and moral ecology of Karen's personhood, both before her brain injury
and during her period of persistent vegetative state.
To be sure, the Quinlan court did not have the language, the meta-
phors, or the background in phenomenological social science to for-
mulate the question in terms like "integrity of the person" or "moral
trespass." There is no reason to think that the judges would have em-
braced such language if it had been suggested to them at the time.
However, the concepts and intuitions that make for the most plausible
and coherent reading of the court's decision require the language of
social personhood and an ecology of care giving relationships to ex-
press the court's meaning. For example, near the legal heart of the text
the court makes the following statement:
We think that the State's interest [in preserving life]
weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
85. See Interview with Mrs. Joseph Quinlan, supra note 82. (1995).
86. See Quinlan, 335 A.2d at 658-59.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 661-662.
89. See id. at 660-661.
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the degree of bodily invasion increases and the progno-
sis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the
individual's right overcomes the State interest. It is for
that reason that we believe Karen's choice [to turn off
the respirator], if she were competent to make it, would
be vindicated."°
The first thing to notice about this formulation is that privacy is
distinct from autonomy. Karen's wishes do not drive the decision, the
right to privacy does. It is because the court recognized Karen's
wishes coincided with what the right to privacy requires, thus vindi-
cating her wish to terminate the extraordinary treatment. 9'
The second point to notice is that the constitutional evaluation of
this situation is two-pronged: it involves medical prognosis and the
"degree of bodily invasion." However, interpreting the notion of bod-
ily invasion narrowly and physically, the position taken by the court is
morally untenable. Assume there are two patients, each of whom has a
grave medical prognosis and is imminently dying. Holding that vari-
able constant, the court essentially says that patient A has a greater
privacy right in refusing major surgery (which is very invasive) than
patient B has in refusing intravenous fluids (which are minimally in-
vasive). Surely this cannot be correct. If there is no reasonable medical
purpose served by an intervention, both patients have an equally
strong right to refuse it regardless of how invasive. Surely the state
has no greater interest in protecting the rights of one of these patients
than it has in the rights of the other.
This objection is avoided, or at least alleviated, by employing the
principle of interpretive charity and reading the concept of "bodily
integrity" in a broader and more social way. Then it can be said pa-
tients vith equally grim prognoses may have different rights to the
extent that a proposed medical treatment or some other intervention
substantially affects their surrounding relationships and care giving.
Under this reasoning, the patient has a right to refuse entry to what-
ever would trespass on that relational and care giving space, without
the state having an interest in sustaining that right.
If medical services do not disrupt the relational integrity surround-
ing the person, and if there is a very low degree invasion of (social)
bodily integrity, then it may be that the patient has a weaker right to
90. Qiunlan, 335 A.2d at 664.
91. See id. at 665.
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resist the intrusion of that service or procedure. For that entity is not
an invader or a trespasser; it is just passing through. Examples of such
entities might be some administrative or organizational rules of the fa-
cility that are designed for safety, efficiency, interests of other resi-
dents, or periodic visits by supervisors or state inspectors in home care
settings. In these particular cases it may be hard to draw the line be-
tween a trespasser and a benign visitor, but that is the relevant ques-
tion. In sum, those things that break the patient's moral community of
caring, witness, and vigil can be much worse than things that break the
patient's skin.
Another peculiar thing about Quinlan is the way it moves back and
forth between considerations that have to do with Karen's autonomy.
92
The court moved from the question of what Karen would want and
whether this accords with what her father was proposing to do towards
considerations of a seemingly more categorical and objective nature.93
In the moral universe constructed by that text, respecting an indi-
vidual's rights was not set in opposition to promoting the individual's
good, and honoring human dignity was not simply a matter of doing
whatever the patient wants or would have wanted. Honoring the integ-
rity of the person means that certain things, under certain circum-
stances, ought not be thrust upon someone. In this case, it means that
medical technology, such as a ventilator, should not be used on a per-
son for whom it provides no substantive benefit - someone whose
human good or flourishing it does not promote, for example, someone
in a permanent unconscious state such as Karen Ann Quinlan. To im-
pose a treatment that promotes no flourishing extension of life is a
wrongful imposition, a violation of boundaries, a breaching of the
zone around a person's body that breaks the moral skin, so to speak. It
compromises something that should remain intact, that ought to have
its integrity preserved. To initiate or continue life-sustaining medical
treatment that imposes and compromises integrity in this way is to
violate privacy. This is wrong not because there is an autonomous
right-to-die, but because it is the proper approach to keep one's moral
skin intact until the very end.
92. See id. at 662-663.
93. See id.
Liberal Neutrality of Living and Dying
IX. CONCLUSION: TALKING A NEW TALK, AND WALKING THE
RAZOR'S EDGE
Privacy's prohibition of moral trespassing is neither subjective nor
procedural; it is not about a patient's preferences or desires, and it is
not about who has the power and authority to make the decision. It is
about what is right and what is wrong in terms of the human good and
the patient's flourishing human body. For Karen Ann Quinlan, the
time when the ventilator could promote her human flourishing, sadly,
had passed.94 Of course, that had to be confirmed, and thus the topic of
medical prognosis loomed large in the case.95 But once medical tests
determined impending death, continued medical life-support became a
trespass, a violation. The wrongness of this trespass has little or noth-
ing to do with what Karen (or any patient) thought or said before her
accident. The moral goal is not primarily to act in accordance with the
patient's wishes or values. Rather, the moral goal is to protect the
person who exists (even without consciousness) as an embodied self
still entangled inrelationships of care and memory.
Privacy understood as personal autonomy stands in sharp contrast to
the notion of privacy as protecting moral boundaries against trespass.
For autonomy, the questions are about the patient's prior beliefs and
values, and whether those wishes have been recorded in advance di-
rectives, not about what medicine can really do and what furthers the
human good. For privacy as protection against moral trespass, some
care-giving relationships are respectful, sustaining meaning and integ-
rity, while some do not. It matters less who makes the decision if the
decision is a morally proper one. With autonomy, it always must be
the patient's own voice, either directly or indirectly heard, that mat-
ters. What that voice says doesn't matter - whether it is Mrs. Helga
Wanglie's voice saying, "Keep me alive," or that of Paul Brophy,
Nancy Jobes, or Nancy Beth Cruzan saying, "Remove me from these
unwanted treatments," - as long as it is the voice of the patient and
no other.
Autonomy has no body, only mind, and it is mind with no sur-
rounding moral and social space filled with relationships that can be
either distorted or undermined by medicine. It was this on which the
Quinlan family focused, filling moral/social space with their ongoing
94. See id. at 656.
95. See id. at 656-657.
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relationship with their daughter, not on the isolated will, hypotheti-
cally reconstructed, of their daughter. It would be a mistake to say that
the court only focused on that dimension of the case, but it would be
equally wrong to say that it focused, like later courts, solely on the
patient's autonomy. It focused on both, or did not see the difference or
possess the appropriate language to express the difference.
In any case, one gets the feeling that the Quinlan court sensed, as
some later courts and ethicists have seen, that it was in that relational
space where Karen, severely diminished though she was, still resided
as a moral entity. That relational space was worthy of protection, even
at the price of shortening Karen's life, because it was constitutive of
Karen's human good.
Americans today are divided by two competing moral images of the
dying. One image is drawn from our great tradition of liberalism and
civil rights. It is the image of the autonomous individual (or her surro-
gate) wielding fundamental moral and legal rights against the coer-
cive, paternalistic, and restrictive power of the state. The other image
is drawn from more domestic sources in our moral imaginations, what
we might call, paraphrasing Michael Oakeshott, the voice of caring in
the conversation of mankind.96 This is the image of protecting the in-
tegrity of the dying person and the surrounding care giving community
against moral trespass and disruption. Medical technology, its dis-
course and its organizational requirements, have tremendous power to
invade, colonize, and distort the life world of a caring community.
And so do government policies motivated by ideology or by financial
and market goals.
It is not yet clear which of these images will ultimately prevail. Is
medical care at the end of life fundamentally-and morally-about
power and the struggle for control between the dying person and the
state? Or is it fundamentally about organizing our care giving and
support systems in such a way that our mortality will be accepted and
that the quality of the last chapter of our lives will be humane, respect-
ful, and dignified? To die well is to be loved, comforted, mourned,
missed, and remembered. This is not a private conception of the good
from which we need liberal neutrality to protect us. It is a tenet of
public reason and moral sense.
96. See Michael Oakeshott, The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of
Mankind in Rationalism in POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 488-541 (1991).
